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InTroducTIon
The Deepwater Horizon tragedy in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, which resulted in the largest ever accidental marine oil spill,1 was a stark reminder of the environmental 
risks posed by the oil and gas industry. Although disasters on 
this scale are fortunately rare, the average oil and gas operation 
has many other commonplace, yet significant, environmental 
impacts throughout its lifespan. Environmental issues begin with 
exploration activities—seismic tests, used to locate petroleum, 
often disturb local wildlife—and carry on to the end of the pro-
duction phase when facilities must be dismantled and disposed 
of.2 The everyday operation of many offshore petroleum instal-
lations involves the discharge of oil-contaminated “produced 
water,” drill cuttings and mud, and production chemicals.3 
Onshore, land clearing for base camps, helipads, roads, pipe-
lines, waste disposal sites, and other facilities has a considerable 
ecological impact.4 Furthermore, the industry is a significant 
contributor to air pollution and a major emitter of greenhouse 
gases. In 2008, thirty-two companies in the International Asso-
ciation of Oil and Gas Producers (“OGP”) reported emissions of 
296 million tonnes (metric tons) of carbon dioxide, 2.1 million 
tonnes of methane, 1.1 million tonnes of non-methane volatile 
organic compounds, 366 thousand tonnes of sulfur dioxide, and 
827 thousand tonnes of nitrous oxides.5
The industry faces increasingly strict environmental stan-
dards in developed countries such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom.6 However, the majority of the world’s proven 
oil reserves are in developing countries and economies in transi-
tion, which often lack sophisticated regimes for environmental 
protection.7 Even when legislative frameworks are well devel-
oped, there are often deficiencies in capacity and an unwilling-
ness to monitor and enforce environmental regulation.8 There is, 
furthermore, no comprehensive global convention on the envi-
ronmental impacts of petroleum exploration and production.9 
Although a number of multilateral and regional agreements 
cover certain aspects of the industry, they require adoption into 
domestic legislation to have a direct effect on international oil 
companies (“IOCs”).10
Apart from domestic and international law, one could also 
look at conditions attached to loans and investment insurance, 
as well as voluntary corporate social responsibility codes as 
sources of environmental standards for the petroleum industry.11 
However, the intent of this article is to shine a light on a much 
less studied and poorly understood domain of environmental 
regulation: the foreign investment contracts signed between 
IOCs (or consortiums of IOCs) and host states, which allocate 
rights to explore for and exploit hydrocarbons within an area of 
land (or an offshore block) over a fixed period of time.
In a 1994 monograph, Zhiguo Gao noted that environmen-
tal issues had “not received enough attention” in the oil and gas 
contracts he had reviewed.12 His conclusion raises the question 
of whether environmental issues have received greater atten-
tion in more recent oil and gas contracts (i.e. those negotiated 
and signed in the last fifteen years). This question is difficult to 
answer, not least because foreign investment contracts gener-
ally are not disclosed to the public.13 Many governments’ model 
agreements are publicly available,14 but it should be noted that 
these models may be substantially altered or ignored altogether 
in the negotiation of actual contracts.15
In this article, sample clauses from forty-one upstream oil 
and gas contracts (both onshore and offshore) covering thirty-
five countries and the period 1994-2008 were reviewed. Four-
teen of the contracts were models.16 An effort was made to 
find the most up-to-date model contracts, as governments peri-
odically revise them. However, it should be noted that some of 
the models were undated. The twenty-seven signed contracts 
reviewed were from twenty-six different countries17 and had an 
average signature date of 1999. Some of contracts in the sample 
are available on the Internet, either because governments have 
chosen to release them or because they have been leaked to non-
governmental organizations (“NGOs”) that have subsequently 
published them. Others are available in company filings to the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
Given the small number of contracts that were reviewed, and 
the great variety of clauses that were encountered, nothing can be 
extrapolated from this preliminary survey about the frequency 
with which any particular type of clause is likely to appear in oil 
and gas contracts. Furthermore, in any given situation, a contract 
should be considered within the broader context of a country’s 
petroleum law, environmental law, and other domestic legisla-
tion. The purpose of the article is not to provide a full picture of 
environmental regulation of petroleum operations in individual 
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countries, but instead to draw attention to how contracts can 
either bolster or undermine environmental protection efforts.
TyPes oF ForeIgn InVesTmenT conTracTs
There are three main types of foreign investment contracts 
in the upstream oil and gas sector: (1) concessions or licenses; 
(2) production sharing contracts (or agreements) (“PSCs” or 
“PSAs”); and (3) risk-service contracts. In addition, all three 
may be subject to association or joint-venture agreements.18 
Under concession contracts and licenses, IOCs are often given 
exclusive rights to explore for and produce hydrocarbons and in 
return are required to pay royalties, taxes, and fees to the govern-
ment.19 In a PSC, the IOC has similar rights, but obtains only 
“cost oil” and a share of any “profit oil” produced, with the state 
recouping the remainder in lieu of, or sometimes in addition to, 
collecting royalties.20 The IOC also pays taxes and fees.21 Under 
a risk-service contract the IOC explores for and produces petro-
leum on behalf the government and is paid a fee for its services, 
with a possible right to buy a portion of the production.22 Asso-
ciation or joint venture agreements involve IOCs partnering with 
host governments or state-owned enterprises and, as in a PSC, 
sharing petroleum production.23
In practice, these forms and labels tend to be much less 
important than the specific content of a contract.24 However, 
one relevant difference is that unlike a typical concession, an 
IOC’s costs are generally recoverable under a PSC in the form 
of “cost oil.” 25 If costs associated with remediating and com-
pensating for environmental harm are “cost recoverable,” then 
the host government, not the IOC, would assume the risk of such 
costs.26 A similar issue may arise with risk-service contracts and 
even with concessions that have royalty rates that are somehow 
indexed to costs.
enVIronmenTaL sTandards cLauses
Most, though not all, of the oil and gas contracts reviewed 
contained a section on the environmental standards to be applied 
to the project. In this regard, there are five general forms that 
contracts appear to follow:
(i) reference to domestic environmental law only;
(ii) reference to international industry standards only;
(iii) reference to both domestic law and international  
 industry standards;
(iv) reference to domestic law and/or industry  
 standards and international environmental  
 agreements; or
(v) development of project-specific environmental  
 standards.
Some reference to domestic environmental legislation is 
clearly desirable from a public policy perspective. Domestic 
standards have been developed (in most cases) under a demo-
cratic system of rule, have often been designed with local envi-
ronmental conditions in mind, are familiar to the agencies that 
are tasked with monitoring and enforcement, and are in the pub-
lic domain. However, as noted previously, in many developing 
countries environmental regulation of the oil and gas sector is 
still in its infancy and it may be inadequate in some situations.27 
As such, reference in contracts to domestic legislation alone may 
be undesirable. In any event, it would appear that parties rarely 
adopt this form. A contract from Peru28 and one from Algeria29 
were the only contracts in the sample that referred solely to 
domestic environmental legislation.
In several of the contracts in the sample, the parties instead 
included a reference to international industry standards and 
failed to mention the application of domestic environmen-
tal law.30 The advantage from an environmental perspective 
of referring to international industry standards is that in some 
cases, they may be higher than, or cover specific issues not 
addressed in, domestic legislation. Furthermore, reference to 
international standards allows some scope for change and evolu-
tion of the environmental management regime of an investment 
over time, thus providing a way around a contractual require-
ment for stability, as will be discussed below. However, there are 
serious problems with referring only to industry standards, given 
their inherent ambiguity. The terminology “good oilfield prac-
tices”31 or “good production practices”32 is frequently employed 
in environmental standards clauses, as well as in other types of 
provisions discussed further below, but these phrases are seldom 
defined.33 A 2002 Cambodian contract provides a rare example 
of a definition:
Good Petroleum Industry Practices means the standards 
and practices, and exercise of that degree of skill, pru-
dence and foresight that would reasonably be expected 
of persons carrying out international petroleum opera-
tions, and adherence to generally accepted standards of 
the international petroleum industry, including sound 
environmental provisions.34
It is not at all clear where exactly one should look for “gen-
erally accepted standards” as there are a multitude of potential 
sources. For example, members of the American Petroleum Insti-
tute (“API”) “pledge” to manage their businesses according to a 
set of eleven environmental principles.35 However, the majority 
of these principles are imprecise, such as the commitment “to 
reduce overall emission and waste generation.”36 The API also 
has guidelines for environmental protection in both onshore 
and offshore oil and gas operations, although they are not freely 
available to the public.37 Other potential sources include guide-
lines produced by the previously mentioned OGP,38 the Austra-
lian Petroleum Production & Exploration Association,39 as well 
as bodies such as the International Organization for Standard-
ization (“ISO”).40 As Wawryk notes, the existence of so many 
guidelines in the petroleum industry makes it impossible to point 
to one that can definitively be considered “good” practice and 
furthermore the “actual practices of international oil companies . 
. . vary from company to company and, for one company, across 
jurisdictions . . . making it difficult to identify the best practices 
actually in use.”41
The majority of contracts reviewed for this article contained 
reference to both domestic environmental law and international 
industry standards. In most cases, there was no mention of how 
these two sources of standards would be reconciled in the event 
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of a conflict. However, in some contracts a form of hierarchy was 
established. For example, Article 21.1 of Brazil’s 2001 Model 
Concession Contract indicates that industry standards are only 
intended to act as a supplement to domestic legislation:
The Concessionaire shall adopt, at its own cost and 
risk, all the necessary measures for the conservation of 
reservoirs and other natural resources and for the pro-
tection of the air, soil and water in the surface or in the 
subsurface, subject to Brazilian legislation and rules 
about environment and, in their absence or lack, adopt-
ing Oil Industry Best Practice in this regard.42
In contrast, the clause below, from a 1994 Azerbaijani con-
tract, has evidently been adopted to ensure that domestic envi-
ronmental regulation is not more stringent than international 
industry standards:
Contractor shall comply with present and future Azer-
baijani laws or regulations of general applicability with 
respect to public health, safety and protection and res-
toration of the environment, to the extent that such laws 
and regulations are no more stringent than the then 
current international Petroleum industry standards and 
practices being at the date of execution of this Contract 
those shown in Appendix IX, with which Contractor 
shall comply.43
In addition to domestic law and industry standards, some 
oil and gas contracts refer to international environmental agree-
ments, although this does not seem to be a common practice. One 
example is Article 6.5 of Liberia’s Model PSC, which states that: 
“The Contractor further undertakes to carry out all petroleum 
operations in accordance with the Environmental Protection 
and Management Laws of Liberia and all international environ-
mental practice.”44 It is questionable whether such a sweeping 
reference to international environmental law will have anything 
more than symbolic value. Provisions in multilateral environ-
mental agreements are not only typically “soft” in nature; they 
also generally require adoption in domestic legislation before 
they can have any impact on private actors.45 Furthermore, few 
environmental agreements tackle specific issues concerning the 
management of petroleum exploration and production. However, 
there are some treaties covering marine pollution that are rel-
evant to offshore operations.46 In this respect, Mauritania’s 1994 
Model PSC is less ambiguous in its reference to international 
environmental law, noting in Article 6.6 that:
The Contractor shall take ail [sic] necessary precautions 
to prevent pollution of the marine area of the Explora-
tion Perimeter and observe, inter alias, the provisions 
of the International Convention on the prevention of 
petroleum pollution of sea waters signed in London on 
May 12, 1954 and the amendments and texts enacted 
for the implementation thereof.47
The final form of standards clause observed in the sample, 
although only in one contract, is the development of a proj-
ect-specific environmental regime. A 1996 contract between 
Azerbaijan and a consortium of investors stipulates that the con-
tractor, the state-owned oil company, and the State Committee 
on Ecology and Control over the Use of Natural Resources will 
jointly agree on a set of safety and environmental standards 
based on “(i) international petroleum industry standards and 
experience with their implementation in exploration and pro-
duction operations in other parts of the world and (ii) existing 
Azerbaijan safety and environmental legislation.”48 Once devel-
oped, this set of standards can only be altered through a written 
agreement and if any standards that have not been agreed upon 
are applied to the project, the investor can invoke the contract’s 
stabilization clause.
sTabILIzaTIon cLauses
According to a 2008 study, the use of “stabilization clauses” 
in host-government contracts “is widespread across industries 
and regions of the world.”49 Stabilization clauses come in vari-
ous forms.50 In their most basic form, they “freeze” the law that 
applies to the investment at the time the contract is signed.51 A 
more nuanced version is often referred to as an “economic equi-
librium” clause, which requires the government to restore the 
balance of risks and rewards established in a contract when it is 
upset by a new regulation or tax.52 A stabilization clause can be 
strictly circumscribed to only cover very specific issues, or the 
parties to the contract can explicitly “carve out” areas such as 
environmental protection from its application. For example, in a 
1997 contract from Kazakhstan, the stabilization clause contains 
the caveat:
provided, however, that no amendment to this Agree-
ment shall be required hereunder as the result of (i) 
changes to Laws concerning health, safety or environ-
mental protection that cause such Laws to be consistent 
with international standards for health, safety or envi-
ronmental legislation and are applied on a non-discrim-
inatory basis . . . .53
As Lorenzo Cotula notes, this provision is weakened by its 
ambiguous reference to “international standards,”54 but it is still 
far preferable to the stabilization clauses found in many con-
tracts and even in model agreements that are worded in such a 
broad manner that they can stifle any future regulation that might 
be perceived to undermine the profitability of an investment, 
including efforts to address corruption, to safeguard human 
rights (including labor rights), and to protect the environment.55
enVIronmenTaL ImPacT assessmenT cLauses
Environmental Impact Assessments (“EIAs”) and corre-
sponding management plans have become a staple requirement 
for investment projects in many sectors.56 Unfortunately, a recent 
survey of environmental governance in petroleum producing 
countries commissioned by the World Bank found that “much 
of the emphasis of the EIA process appears directed towards 
the approval of oil and gas projects, rather than to a life cycle 
approach for minimizing environmental and social impact.”57
An EIA is typically mandated to be completed after a con-
tract with the state has been signed58 and most of the contracts 
reviewed for this article contained some reference to the need 
for an EIA. However, the form of the EIA clauses varied widely 
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across the sample from a simple note of the existence of a 
requirement,59 to detailed specifications of what the EIA should 
cover, who should prepare it, when it should be submitted, and 
so forth.60
cLauses on access To ProTecTed areas
Petroleum operations are particularly contentious when 
they are located, even partially, within wildlife reserves, parks, 
or areas of cultural or biological significance.61 NGOs have 
long argued that such areas should be off limits to the extrac-
tive industries,62 but most governments are not ready to forgo 
the potential economic opportunities that the exploitation of 
these areas offer. This is evident in several of the contracts in the 
sample. For example, Article 37.6 of Madagascar’s 2006 Model 
Offshore PSC states:
In the event that a portion of the Contract Area is 
located within a natural reserve area, the Operator shall 
deploy the necessary efforts in order to minimize the 
negative impacts on these natural reserves, in accor-
dance with generally accepted environmental practices 
in the international petroleum industry.63
This is an incredibly weak provision. A 2004 PSC from 
Uganda is similarly permissive, but it also contains a bizarre 
caveat:
In the event of protest from responsible concerned third 
parties within or outside Uganda regarding the conduct 
of Petroleum Operations in any National Park or Game 
Reserve and the consequent effects upon the environ-
ment or wildlife, the Government and Licensee shall 
meet to determine what if any action should be taken.64
Given that this clause provides nothing more than an obliga-
tion for the investor and the government to meet, it is question-
able why the parties bothered to include it at all.
cLauses on access To WaTer &  
oTher naTuraL resources
Petroleum operations require natural materials in their con-
struction phase, and significant amounts of water and electricity 
throughout their operation. While many operations are self-suffi-
cient in terms of energy supply, other natural resources may need 
to be obtained from within or outside the contract area.
From an environmental and community rights perspective, 
as well as from an economic-development perspective, it is dis-
turbing that many governments appear to focus solely on the 
potential revenue that they can obtain from petroleum produc-
tion and are willing to simply give away other valuable natural 
resources under the terms of oil and gas contracts. For example, 
Article 27.8 of Mozambique’s 2007 Model concession contract 
provides for the right of the investor “to drill for and have the free 
use of water and impound surface waters.”65 A contract from the 
Kurdistan Regional Government of Iraq is even broader, giving 
the contractor the right to “freely use sand, water, electricity, and 
any other natural resources located inside or outside the Contract 
Area for the Petroleum Operations.”66
Some of the contracts in the sample were completely silent 
on the issue of access to natural resources, and a small num-
ber had more nuanced provisions than those quoted above. For 
example, a 1994 contract from Ethiopia states that the contrac-
tor shall “have the right, subject to the approval of the Minister, 
to use water in the Contract Area for operational purposes, but 
the Contractor shall not deprive any land, domestic settlement 
or livestock watering place of the water supply to which they 
are accustomed.”67 A 2008 Model PSC from Bangladesh goes a 
step further by requiring that the contractor pay for the natural 
resources, such as water, that it utilizes.68
cLauses on gas FLarIng
The World Bank estimated in 2004 that the volume of asso-
ciated gas being flared and vented globally every year was about 
110 billion cubic meters—enough fuel to provide the combined 
annual natural gas consumption of Germany and France.69 
Although some short-term flaring during testing or in cases of 
emergencies is accepted as standard practice in the industry, the 
flaring of more substantial amounts of gas is only practiced in 
poor countries with limited infrastructure and weak regulatory 
institutions.70 Aside from being incredibly wasteful, flaring has a 
significant impact on local air quality and also makes an appre-
ciable contribution to climate change.71 At the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002, the World 
Bank launched a Global Gas Flaring Reduction initiative to 
tackle the problem.72 Despite this development, and widespread 
condemnation of the practice, flaring continues in many states. 
In 2008, thirty-two companies in the OGP admitted to flaring 
18.6 tonnes of gas for every thousand tonnes of hydrocarbon that 
they produced.73
Many oil and gas contracts, even recent models, appear to 
be lenient on the issue of flaring. For example, the Bangladesh 
2008 Model PSC notes in Article 15.3 that:
Any Associated Natural Gas as is not used under Article 
15.1 or Article 15.2 and which Contractor does not con-
sider possible to recover economically shall be offered 
to Petrobangla without any payment to Contractor but 
at Petrobangla’s cost at the well-head or field facilities 
in the Production Area. To the extent that Petrobangla 
does not so take any of such Associated Natural Gas, 
Contractor may flare such Associated Natural Gas pro-
vided that such flaring is included in the Development 
Plan submitted under Article 8.10.74
Although this clause gives priority to utilization of the 
resource, there is no requirement for the gas to be reinjected 
into the ground if it is not taken by the state-owned enterprise, 
and economic concerns clearly trump environmental ones.75 A 
1997 contract from Indonesia also reflects this position in the 
statement that gas “may be flared if processing and utilization 
thereof is not economical.”76 Other contracts, such as a 2000 
contract from Belize77 and a 1998 contract from Angola,78 allow 
for flaring only if it is authorized by the government. A Ugan-
dan contract from 2004 also follows this model, but includes the 
caveat that the government’s consent “shall not be unreasonably 
SuStainable Development law & policy19
withheld or delayed.”79 The most stringent clauses, found in only 
a few contracts in the sample, restricted flaring to cases of an 
emergency or for safety reasons.80
cLauses on resPondIng To emergencIes  
and accIdenTs
In 2008, thirty-two companies in the OGP reported 2,978 
spills greater than one barrel in size, resulting in the release of 
18,266 tonnes of oil into terrestrial and marine environments.81 
In many of the oil and gas contracts in the sample, the parties 
have recognized that spills and other accidents and emergencies 
have the potential to occur and should be planned for. As such, 
as a part or separate from an EIA, an emergency response plan is 
often required from the contractor.82
Some oil and gas contracts also cover three additional ele-
ments in respect of emergencies: notification, response, and 
consequences for failure to respond. In the oil and gas contracts 
reviewed, notification was limited to the contractor apprising the 
government of the situation, but not the local community or the 
broader public.83 In terms of response, the requirements were 
often vague (e.g., “take prudent steps”) or simply provided refer-
ence to good oilfield practices.84 However, some of the contracts 
in the sample did additionally stipulate that in the event that the 
contractor did not act promptly to respond to an emergency or 
accident, the government had the right to mount its own response 
and charge the contractor for expenses that it incurred in doing 
so. An example is found in a PSC from Ghana:
If Contractor does not act promptly so as to control, 
clean up or repair any pollution or damage, GNPC 
[Ghana National Petroleum Corporation] may, after 
giving Contractor reasonable notice in the circum-
stances, take any actions which are necessary, in accor-
dance with accepted Petroleum industry practice and 
the reasonable costs and expenses of such actions shall 
be borne by Contractor and shall, subject to Article 
17.5 be included as Petroleum Costs.85
cLauses on LIabILITy, IndemnITy, & Insurance
Liability for environmental damage is an increasingly 
important issue for the oil industry. The dispute between Chev-
ron and the residents of the Ecuadorian Amazon concerning the 
company’s liability for oil pollution is a prime example of why 
most modern contracts have express provisions on liability that 
cover environmental damage.86
Issues of liability for environmental damage can be com-
plex, especially when multiple parties, including state-owned 
enterprises, are involved in petroleum production. Contracts, 
therefore, should have provisions that are explicit about who is 
to be liable for what and to whom. The issue of “who” depends 
somewhat on the form of contract, but generally it is the con-
tractor or concessionaire (the IOC) who will be liable, except in 
cases where fault can be directly attributed to the state or state-
owned enterprise.87 If there is more than one contractor involved 
in the project, then there will likely be a clause that stipulates 
that they are jointly and severally liable.88
The issue of “what” concerns the types of harms (e.g., only 
death or injury or also “damage to the environment”), the period 
in which the harms were caused (i.e. no liability for prior envi-
ronmental damage established in a baseline assessment), and the 
legal form of the liability (fault, strict, or absolute).89 Finally, on 
the issue of to “whom” the contractor is liable, there are typi-
cally two separate issues covered in contracts: liability to the 
state and liability to third parties. 90 In the latter case, the issue is 
not directly one of liability—contracts cannot affect the rights of 
third parties under national law—but rather one of indemnity.91 
Through indemnity clauses, IOCs commit to compensate states 
for any costs incurred resulting from a third-party liability suit.92
Most contracts in the sample made specific mention of 
“pollution” or “environmental damage” in liability/indemnity 
clauses and adopted a strict liability approach.93 However, a 
2002 Cambodian94 contract provided only for fault liability. The 
most developed liability/indemnity clause in the sample was 
from a contract signed by Belize in 2000, which required that the 
contractor contribute one tenth of one percent of the value of the 
gross annual production to a fund managed by the government 
“for the sole purpose of indemnification against any or all envi-
ronmental damages cause during the petroleum operations.”95
An additional issue closely related to liability and indemnity 
is the requirement for contractors to have insurance coverage. 
These clauses often specify that insurance should cover “pollu-
tion” or “environmental damage.”96 One potential problem with 
both liability/indemnity and insurance clauses is that the term 
“pollution” is quite narrow and does not cover all of the vari-
ous environmental impacts from oil and gas operations.97 Even 
references to “environmental damage” could be subject to inter-
pretation if not defined in the contract.
cLauses on decommIssIonIng & remedIaTIon
When an oil operation reaches the end of production, a 
number of costly activities must be undertaken. Onshore wells 
need to be plugged and structures dismantled, with materials 
removed and ultimately recycled or disposed of. Remediation of 
the local environment (e.g., decontamination and revegetation) 
may also be required. Offshore installations present particularly 
complex issues in terms of decommissioning, although it is also 
in this area that international law has its most direct and signifi-
cant impact on the oil and gas industry.98
The extent to which decommissioning is dealt with in con-
tracts depends somewhat on the contractual relationship between 
the parties and the expected life of the project. Under some 
arrangements, states retain ownership over production facilities 
and may continue operations after the termination of the con-
tract. However, even in such instances, there may be contractual 
provisions covering decommissioning of installations that are 
not destined to be taken over by the state.
Clauses on decommissioning and remediation found in con-
tracts in the sample were generally lacking in detail. For exam-
ple, a 1997 PSC from Benin states:
At the end of the Contract, in any other situation than 
the abandonment case, the Contractor must take the 
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measures according to the Good Practices of the Oil 
Industry to restore the environment and the sites where 
the Petroleum Operations have been performed to 
their original state on the Effective Date of the Con-
tract, taking into account the rules of the abandonment 
procedure.99
Although this provision appears quite strict, as it sug-
gests that sites should be restored to their “original state,” it is 
weakened by the generic reference to good oilfield practices.100 
According to a recent World Bank report, the absence of guide-
lines for what should be included in a decommissioning plan is a 
pervasive problem in petroleum producing countries.101
In addition to an absence of guidelines, there are obviously 
strong incentives for some companies to “cut and run” or to con-
duct only superficial remediation to minimize costs. One method 
for ensuring that decommissioning and remediation are carried 
out to plan is to use a financial mechanism such as a perfor-
mance bond or reserve fund. Tanzania is an example of a country 
that has set up such a regime in its 2008 Model PSC.102
concLusIon
Since Gao’s study was published in 1994,103 there have 
been significant changes in the content of upstream oil and gas 
contracts vis-à-vis environmental protection. The small sample 
of contracts reviewed in this article indicates that a significant 
number of clauses covering a variety of issues—from baseline 
environmental assessments all the way through to environmental 
remediation—can be found in modern contracts. Given the mon-
umental increase in environmental awareness and the intense 
scrutiny that the industry has come under in the two decades, 
this is unsurprising. What is remarkable is that a handful of con-
tracts still resemble those that Gao criticized for having only a 
token mention of environmental protection, and that references 
to ambiguous terms such as “good oilfield practices” remain so 
pervasive.
Further research will be required to build an understand-
ing of why there are such wide disparities in contracting prac-
tice between countries. For example, it would be interesting to 
explore whether the environmental provisions in oil and gas con-
tracts reflect domestic attention to these issues or if the capac-
ity of the government to negotiate with IOCs is a more relevant 
factor. Additionally, empirical work is required to determine the 
extent to which contract clauses on environmental issues are 
actually implemented by IOCs and monitored and enforced by 
governments.
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